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This paper is about the nature, legal and financial structure of democratic firm in David Ellerman's view. Democratic firm is a 
company „owned“ and controlled by all people working in it. It's ownership structure rests on principle that people have natural 
and inalienable right to the fruits of their labour. In addition, it's governence  structure rests on principle that people have a natural 
and inalienable right to economic self-determination. In democratic firm voting rights and rights to the net income are restructered 
as personal rights assigned to the functional role of working in the firm. Net asset rights remain property rights and they are 
registered on the internal capital accounts and they are quite separated from membership rights. Most popular examples of 
democratic firms are workers cooperatives and ESOP companies. This companies are analysed through restructuring or lack of 
restructuring conventional bundle of property rights. However, there are many questions about economic democracy that are left 
opened. 
Key words: democratic firm, economic democracy, membership rights, internal capital accounts, workers cooperatives, ESOP 
companies. 
 
Teorija demokratskog poduzeća Davida Ellermana. Ovaj rad obrađuje poglede David Ellermana na prirodu, pravnu i 
financijsku strukturu demokratskog poduzeća. Demokratsko poduzeće je poduzeće u „vlasništvu“ i kontrolirano od strane ljudi 
koji rade u njemu. Njegova struktura vlasništva počiva na načelu da ljudi imaju prirodno i neotuđivo pravo na proizvode svoga 
rada. Nadalje, njegova struktura upravljanja počiva na načelu da ljudi imaju prirodno i neotuđivo pravo na demokratsko 
samoodređenje. U demokratskom poduzeću su prava glasa i prava na neto dohodak restrukturirana kao osobna prava  te su 
dodijeljena funkcionalnoj ulozi rada u poduzeću. Neto imovinska prava ostaju vlasnička prava zabilježena na internim kapitalnim 
računima te su posve razdvojena od članskih prava. Najpoznatiji primjeri demokratskih poduzeća su radničke zadruge i ESOP 
poduzeća. Analizira se način na koji ova poduzeća restrukturiraju ili ne restrukturiraju konvencionalnu košaru vlasničkih prava. 
Međutim, postoje mnoga pitanja o ekonomskoj demokraciji koja su ostavljena otvorena. 
Ključne riječi: demokratsko poduzeće, ekonomska demokracija, članska prava, interni kapitalni računi, radničke zadruge, 





Economic democracy and thereby 
democratic firms are not new topics; they 
have centuries of history. But, it seems like, 
there is a rich history of keeping on same 
metodological dilusions and repeating 
practical mistakes regardles of what history 
is telling. Also, it seems like that David 
Ellerman did manage to perceive some of 
those dilusions and offer an alternative 
approach, by which some, if not all mistakes, 
could be avoided. So, this paper examines 
that approach, that is, it reviews most 
important features of Ellerman's theory of 
democratic firm. Democratic firm is defined 
as  „a company which is „owned“ and 
controlled by all the people working in it“ 
[1].  In addition economic democracy „is a 
market economy where the predominant 
number of firms are democratic firms.“ [1] 
The paper starts with reviewing of 
the basic principles on which the governance 
and ownership structure of democratic firm 
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rests. After that, those principles are 
implemented in the enterprise and on that 
basis, there is description of legal and 
financial structure of democratic firm as well 
as the nature of it, which (above all) main 
feature is restructuring of conventional 
bundle of ownership rights. On the basis of 
given structure, we proceed with 
examination of main democratic firms 
models  that can be found under capitalism; 
worker cooperatives and ESOP's and the 
focus of analysis is how they (or do not) 
restructure conventional bundle of 
ownership rights. Before conclusion we are 
asking some questions about democratic 
firm, and above all, economic democracy 
that are left open and that are preventing us 
to get complete picture about this field of 
social science.  
It is important to understand what 
this paper is not about, that is, important 
topics and aspects of Ellerman's theory of 
democratic firm  that are not examined here. 
Above all, there is no validation of 
Ellerman's property theory. It is more 
appropriate to do that in separate article with 
different focus. Except of democratic theory 
implementation on governence structure of a 
firm, this paper doesn't analyse organiza-
tional structure of the firm even the question 
arise later. Also, most appropriate model of 
democratic firm for other, and thus 
„postransitional“ countries is excepted from 
this paper. So there is almost no mentioning 
of hybrid democratic firm model or other 
more or less similar models.  
Democratic firms and economic 
democracy have broad philosophical, 
historical, legal, economic, political, 
enviromental and generally social meaning. 
This article reviews just some aspects of 
them. Many aspects and questions are still 
open. But, that is normal and natural. By 
answering theoretical questions and  by 
solving practical problems, new questions 
and problems arise. 
 
  
TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES: LABOUR 
THEORY OF PROPERTY AND 
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
 
Ellerman's theory of democratic 
worker-owned firm rests on two principles: 
(1) structure of property is based on 
principle that people have a natural and 
inalienable rights to the fruits of their labour 
(2) the governance structure is based on 
principle that people have natural and 
inalienable right to democratic self-
determination [1]. In this chapter we first 
examine the basics of the fruits-of-they-
labour principle which is called labour 
theory of property, and then we will see how 
the democratic theory is applied to the firm 
„Mainstream economic theory is only 
concerned with a transfer of property rights 
on the market. But to be transferable, 
property right first must be created. So, in 
any production process, the question of 
appropriation (acquistion of the inital or 
first-time property) arise.“ [1] There are two 
questions about property appropriation; 
descriptive and normative. Descriptive 
question is – how that one party rather then 
another appropriates whole product
2
 of a 
production process. Or, other words who 
appropriates the whole product? It is not 
necessary the owner of the means of 
production, but the legal party who has, so 
called, residual claimant role. Residual 
claimant is a legal party who bears the costs 
of inputs used-up in production process (e.g. 
material inputs, labour cost and the used-up 
services of capital assets) and has ownership 
over the product which is a result of 
production process. That „residual“ is 
economic profit which is a value of 
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produced inputs minus the value of the used-
up inputs. Capital owner is a legal party that 
owns the means of production (e.g. capital 
assets like equipment and plant) used-up in 
production process [1]. These two roles can 
be easily separeted without changing the 
ownership over the means of production -  
rent out the capital assets. If the means of 
production are leased to another legal party, 
the lessor retains the ownership over the 
means of production, but if the leasee (if he 
doesn't sublesse the assets)  takes over 
production process, then he has to pay up the 
costs of other inputs and he has a right to the 
outputs that are (positive) result of 
production process. Residual claimant is 
therefore contractual role, not the property 
right. The belief that „being the firm“ 
(having a residual claimant role) is structural 
part of the bundle of property rights referred 
to as ownership over means of production, 
Ellerman calls fundmental myth [1] [2].
3
 
The normative question of property 
appropriation is which legal party ought to 
legally appropriate the whole product. Other 
words, who ought to have residual claimant 
role. The answer comes from unique 
characteristic of labour - only labour can be 
responsible. „It is remarkable“, says 
Ellerman, „how human science of 
„Economics“ had not been able to recognize 
any fundamental difference between 
intentional human actions and service of 
things“ [1]. Neoclassical economics uses two 
pictures of production process – active 
poetical picture and passive engineering 
picture where in both cases labour is 
symetrical with service of things.
4
 But, the 
responsibility for action cannot be assigned 
to things, no matter of their causal efficacy. 
In the adjacent field of jurisprudence there is 
no assigning of responsibillity to things. 
Things can only serve as conductors of 
responsibility, never a source. If the burglar 
committs a crime the responsibility will not 
be assigned to equipment he used. The 
assigment of legal (de jure) responsibility is 
called imputation. „The basic juridical 
principle of imputation is that de jure 
responsibility is to be imputed in accordance 
with de facto or factual responsibility“
5
 [1] . 
In the economic context the intentional 
human actions are called labour, so the 
juridical principle of imputation can be 
expressed as the labour theory of property, 
which holds that people should appropriate 
the positive and negative fruits of their 
labour [2]. 
Any party, says Ellerman, can 
become the residual claimant by becoming 
hiring party, that is, the party who hires (or 
already owns) all the inputs used up in the 
production. „The workers claim and right to 
positive and negative fruits of their labour is 
legally defeated by workers being hired, that 
is, by employment contract. When the 
person signs the employment contract i.e 
when is employed or rented, then he or she 
don't have legal responsibility for positive 
and negative fruits of his or her actions - that 
responsibility goes to employer. But de facto 
responsibility is independent of  legal 
contracts because  people do not suddenly 
become non-responsible tools when they 
sign the employment contract.“ [1] De facto 
responsibility stays, but it is the reaction of 
the law that suddenly changes. When the 
some venture is „jointly carried out“ by 
employess it is legally percepted as fullfiling 
the employment contract. But if the crime is 
comitted then legal system will not allow 
fictional transfer of responsibillity, and the 
labour theory of property will be 
implemented. Suddenly, the enterprise 
becomes partnership of all people working in 
it. Ellerman uses nice and not so nice word 
for it- legal fiction and fraud. De facto 
responsibillity is not transferable like the 
service of things regardless of legal 
suprastructure. So the employment contract 
is naturally invalid contract because it 
alienate and transfers something that is 
factually inalienable. So, Ellerman's main 
argument is to disadopt inherently invalid
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contract. If we didn't have the legalize 
system of fraud, every enterprise would be 
partnership of everyone working in the firm. 




The peoples right to democratic self-
determination in work is also neglected by 
employment contract. Like the 
responsibility, decision-making capabillity is 
also something inalienable. „Deciding to do 
as one is told is only another way of 
deciding what to do. People cannot in fact 
alienate or taransfer decision-making 
capabillity-but person can delegate authority 
to make a decision to other persons acting as 
their representitives“ [1]. When the 
enterprise has at least one person employed, 
then it becomes the organization for 
governance of people and the question of the 
democracy arise. For aplication of 
democratic theory to the firm some aspects 
are especially important. First is the 
democratic principle that says that direct 
control rights (positive decision-making 
rights) over an organization should be 
assigned to the people who are governed by 
the organization so they will be self-
governing. Secondly, democratic rights are 
assigned to persons as personal rights, not a 
property rights
7
. Democratic organization is 
thus, the people-based organization ,not 
property based organization. With this 
important notions and aspects, we can now 
move to the structure of democratic firm. 
 
 
PRINCIPLES AND NATURE OF 
DEMOCRATIC FIRM AND ITS LEGAL 
AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
  
Most companies are based on renting 
human beings. Democratic firm  theory 
represents an alternative to private and 
public renting of human beings where the 
employment by the firm is replaced with the 
membership in the firm. In the conventional 
capitalist corporation, shareholders own, as 
property rights, conventional bundle of 
rights which include: (a) membership or 
residual claimant rights: 1. Voting rights 
(e.g., to elect the Board of Directors) and 2. 
Net income rights to the residual and (b) net 
asset rights: 3. Net asset rights to the net 
value of current corporate assets and 
liabilities. „Restructuring of the corporate 
ownership to create a democratic firm does 
not mean just  finding a new set of  owners 
(such as the „employees“) for that bundle of 
rights. It means taking the bundle apart and 
restructuring the rights so that the whole 
nature of „corporate ownership“ is changed“ 
[1]. 
We saw that democratic firm is based 
on two principles; democratic principle of 
self-goverment and labour theory of 
property. These principles are correlated 
respectively with the first two rights in 
conventional bundle - voting rights and net 
income rights which will be called 
membership rights. Democratic principle 
implies that the voting rights should be 
assigned to the workers, and labour theory of 
property implies that residual claimant role 
should be assigned to the workers [2]. Now 
we can see how these principles are built in 
the structure of democratic firm. 
Democratic principle of self-
goverment is built in the structure of 
democratic firm by assigning the right to 
elect the governors to the functional role of 
being governed. Only people who are under 
authority of management are workers. 
External parties are outside the firm. So, by 
democratic principle neither the outside 
shareholders have the right to representative 
on the board - that is not democracy. 
Shareholders democracy also isn't democra-
cy. Also, democratic socialism
8
 is not 
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democratic in theory and less in practice. 
Democratic firm can only be the corporation 
where the workers directly elect the Board of 
Directors. Labour theory of property is 
implemented in the legal structure of a 
company by assigning the residual rights to 
the functional role of working in the 
company. That means that workers of the 
company need to appropriate the positive 
(outputs)  and negative (used-up inputs) 
fruits of their labour. Thus, if the P is unit 
price of outputs Q, and the R is the unit 
rental rate for input services K, then the 
residual PQ-RK (revenue minus non-labour 
costs) is labour income. So, labour income in 
democratic firms is accuring both as wages 
or salaries and as profits only there is timing 
difference between them [1].  Aplication of 
basic principles implies structure of demo-
cratic firm which will be analysed hereafter.  
In democratic firm membership 
rights (voting rights and net income rights) 
are not property rights at all. They are 
personal rights assigned to the functional 
role of working in the firm – to the workers. 
Hence, only people working in the firm have 
a right to e.g. elect a governors -  Board of 
Directors on a one member – one vote 
principle and only people working in the 
firm have a right to net income. Exception 
are workers on probationary period, but that 
is only temporary period. After that it is „up 
or out“
9
, so all long-term workers are 
members of the firm. When worker is 
retiring or otherwise leaving the firm, then 
his membership right are „suspended“ and 
they „stay“ in the firm. So, workers after that 
don't have voting rights or net income rights. 
If they are leaving because of working in 
another democratic firm, then they (after 
initial probationary period) get membership 
rights in that firm. So, unlike the member-
ship rights in capitalist corporation which are 
attached to shares (as property rights) and 
are transferable on stock market and private 
transactions, in democratic firm they are 
assigned to the functional role of working in 
the firm and they are not transferable, 
marketable and inheritable.
10
 In contrary the 
treatment of third set of rights – the net asset 
rights is quite different. This is the most 
difficult question about the structure of 
democratic firm and is traditionally 
misinterpret as well as source of many 
problems, pitfalls and controversy in (lets 
call it) economic democracy movment [1]. 
So, we need to give it special attention. 
For that purpose, let assume that 
democratic firm has some positive net 
surplus – economic profit. Theoretically, the 
workers can distribute all earnings as labour 
bonuses, deposit them on saving account and 
finance investment through loan. Then 
workers would not lose value of that 
earnings and they still will be able to finance 
investment e.g – new machine. Of course, 
the bank gets no voting rights or share in 
profits . Bank only gets interest on loan. 
There is no violation of „socialist principles“ 
because there is no private claim on social 
equity capital. But, how it is different that if 
instead of going thourgh all complications of 
paying out earnings, depositing them on a 
savings account in a bank and borrowing the 
money back, that firm directly retains 
earnings and opens individual savings 
account for each memeber inside the firm at 
which a certain portion of earnings is 
credited. Then the value of each account 
would be essentially loan capital-it would be 
hired by labour, it would receive interest and 
get no votes or profit. That accounts are 
called internal capital accounts and they 
have been developed in Mondragon (see 
below). They represent internal debt 
recoupable by individual workers but they 
are separated from membership rights [1]. 
There are two types of internal 
capital accounts. Individual internal capital 
accounts contain a value of standard 
membership fee plus value of retained 
earnings alocated to members in accordance 
to labour (mesaured by wages or salaries or 
in some cases hours of work, in workers 
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cooperatives that measure is called labour 
patronage). They may represent the value of  
the past fruits of labour. That is, net asset 
value may come from labour of past 
members who don't have functional role of 
working in the firm anymore. There is no 
reason why they should lose their initial 
endowment and the value of their past labour 
just because they decide to retain earnings 
instead of distributing them as bonuses 
(equivalent of dividends). Hence, the third 
right should remain, in Ellerman's opinion, 
property right eventually recoupable by 
members. This is not violation of „socialist 
principles“ because membership rights 
remain the same regardless of the value on 
internal capital accounts – still there is one 
member – one vote principle and profits are 
allocated in accordance to labour [1]. 
There are roughly two ways for 
distribution of value from individual internal 
capital accounts. One way is to distribute 
them upon retirement or otherwise leaving 
the firm over a period of years. This way 
has, for Ellerman, several disadvantages. In 
this scheme the value on accounts of older 
workers are much bigger than of young 
workers, so they bear a higher risk. This 
could result with incentive by older (better 
trained and more exeperienced) workers to 
leave the firm „in the right time“ and reduce 
the risk. It is not good that payouts from 
accounts are function of unpredictable 
terminations because among other, in that 
case, it is difficult to plan cash flows of a 
firm. Finally 20,30 or 40 years is to distant 
time horizont to create motivation for 
younger workers. These problems can be 
solved with so called account rollover 
scheme. In this payout model account, 
allocation have some date and entries are 
paid out after some fixed time period on 
some type of first-in-first-out basis (FIFO). 
If the entry survives some risk of being 
debited to cover losses then it is paid out. 
Current retained earnings are allocated 
among all the members accounts, but the 
current cash payments are made to older 
entries and larger accounts and in that way 
the accounts of older and younger workers 
tend to equalize. Older workers then receive 
wages and five-year lagged rollover 
payments. Younger workers do not receive 
rollover payments during first (e.g.) five or 
seven years. It is like „they are paying a 
„mortgage“ to older workers until they 
become enough old to start receving 
„mortgage payments“. Thus, incentive to 
terminate membership is reduce because the 
payouts are independent of termination, 
accounts are  equalized so is risk, younger 
workers have more motivation and cash flow 
planing is eased [1]. 
Democratic firm can always be 
endowed with some net asset value by say 
goverment unit or another democratic firm. 
There is no reason why this value should 
ultimately accrue to workers. So, democratic 
firm needs to have another type of account. 
Second type of account is collective internal 
capital account. It represents the value that 
is not recoupable to individual members. It is 
like a collective patrimony that is procurable 
to next generations. So, net asset value (asset 
value minus external debt) is equal to sum of 
individual and collective internal capital 
accounts. Ellerman finds another reason for 
democratic firm to have collective capital 
account-namely self-insurance. In uncertain 
world democratic firm cannot always pay 
100% retained earnings. By having this type 
of account, firm allocates certain percentage 
of retained earnings to collective account as 
„self-insurance“ allocation and thus can 
assure that remaining percentage will be 
eventually paid out to members. In the case 
of liquidation, any net value left after paying 
out the external and internal debts should not 
accrue to current members, but to some 
charitable organization or to all past 
members (or hires) [1]. 
After we examined the basic 
characteristics of nature as well as legal and 
financial structure of democratic firm in 
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Ellerman's view, we can look how do 
empirical examples of so called democratic 
firms fit into Ellerman's view and what are 
the problems and consequences of different 
treatment of „ownership“ rights. For that 
purpose we will restrict our analyses on two 
major types of „democratic“ firms in 
capitalism; workers cooperatives and 




WORKERS COOPERATIVES AND 
EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP 
PLAN COMPANIES (ESOPs) 
 
In the capitalism, two most popular 
and wide spread examples of companies that 
are usually called democratic firms are 
worker cooperatives and Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan companies (ESOPs). If we 
use Ellerman's shape as a standard for 
comparation there are not so many reasons 
to call many of these firms democratic firms. 
Main point is to consider how different types 
treat membership and net asset rights and 
what problems come out of lack of 
restructuring conventional bundle of 
ownership rights. We will start with workers 
cooperatives. 
All cooperatives have two broad 
characteristics: (1) voting on a one 
person/one-vote basis and (2) allocation of 
residual on the basis of their patronage. 
Patronage is defined differently in different 
types of cooperatives. Worker cooperative is 
a cooperative where the members are people 
working in the company and where the 
patronage is based on labour (measured by 
pay or working hours). „Thus, a worker 
cooperative is a company where the 
membership rights (the voting rights and 
profit rights) are assigned to the people 
working in the company – with voting 
always on a one person/one vote basis and 
the profit allocation on the basis of labour 
patronage“ [1]. There are three types of 
worker cooperatives; traditional worker 
stock cooperatives, common ownership 
firms and mondragon type of worker 
cooperatives. The main difference is in the 
treatment of  third right, that is net asset 
rights. 
The main mistake of traditional 
worker stock cooperatives (like plywood 
cooperatives in North America) is they use 
one legal instrument – membership share to 
carry both membership rights and net asset 
rights. Thus, membership share carries also 
essentially capital value accruing to any 
retiring member. Even the worker gets only 
one vote regardless of number of 
membership shares he owns and even the 
dividends are based on labour patronage, 
new worker must buy membership share in 
order to became a member – he doesn't 
became a member just on a basis on work. 
Value of membership share rises 
considerably. In successful plywood 
cooperative it may rise to 95 000$. Of 
course, potential member doesn't have 
enough money to buy membership share, so 
that types of cooperatives tend to employee 
new workers instead of giving them 
membership. When a first generation of 
members goes to retirement, whole 
cooperative  might be sold to capitalist firm 
in order to finance founders retirement. 
Thus, traditional workers cooperatives tend 
to degenerate into capitalist firms either 
slowly (by hiring non-member workers) or 
quickly ( by sale of company). That's why 
Vanek called them „mule firms“ – they do 
not tend to reproduce themselves for another 
generations. „They are not labour-based 
firms, but rather confused combination of 
capitalist features (membership based on 
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share ownership) and cooperative attributes 
(one vote per member)“ [1]. 
Labour-based democratic firm 
assigns membership rights to the functional 
role of working in the firm. But there are 
differences in tretment of the third right – 
right to the net asset value. Common 
ownership firms in England (as well as ex-
Yugoslav self-managed firms but under 
another socio-economic system) treat net 
asset right completely as social or common 
property. This means that they assign 
membership rights to the functional role of 
working in the firm, but deny any recoupable 
claim on the fruits of past labour reinvested 
in the firm. So, there is a tendency to 
distribute all earnings as bonuses and finance 
investment by loan. But, any lender is quite 
suspicious to lend money to firm that doesn't 
have incentive to bulid its own equity and 
whose members don't have direct financial 
stake in company. That problem maybe will 
not accure in well-established firms like 
John Lewis Partnership. But small startup 
workers cooperatives will have these 
problems. So this model is maybe 
appropriate for small, labour-intensive and 
service-oriented worker cooperatives. Also, 
it creates the image of a worker cooperatives 
as „dwarfish“, labour-intensive, under-
financed, low-pay, marginal firms [1] [3] 
Many of problems that accure in traditional 
worker stock cooperatives and common 
ownership firms, by Ellerman's opinion, can 
be solved with sistem of internal capital 
accounts that is social inovation of 
Mondragon. 
Mondragon is most famous example 
in cooperative movment which grew from 
first worker cooperative in 1956. (ULGOR) 
to almost 300 more or less interrelated 
cooperatives and other organizations to year 
2012 in the areas of industry, finance, retail 
and knowledge. „Autonomus development 
of the Mondragon cooperatives helped them 
to think through intelligent and creative 
answers to the problem of cooperative 
structure –instead of just copying the 
mistakes of the past“ [3]. It seems that 
Mondragon opposes almost all traditional 
arguments againts worker cooperatives. It is 
the seventh largest corporation in Spain with 
over 80 000 people working in it and worker 
cooperatives that produce many high-tech 
products. For example, first industrial robots 
developed in Spain, were developed in 
Mondragon [1] [3]. 
The Mondragon has many unique 
contributions, but four social inventions 
deserve a special attention. First is credit 
cooperative bank Caja Laboral Populare 
(CLP) established in 1959
11
  which enabled 
a rapid grow of Mondragon.  CLP had 
entreprenurial division which helped new 
cooperatives to built their business plans and 
much more than that
12
 and which now is 
separate cooperative. Also, in Mondragon 
primacy of labour is bulit into other types of 
cooperatives e.g. consumer, agricultural or 
superstructural
13
. But, the most important 
feature for this paper is the treatment, that is 
restructuring of conventional ownership 
bundle especially system of internal capital 
accounts.[3] 
In Mondragon membership rights are 
attached as personal rights to the functional 
role of working in a firm. After a 
probationary period, new member must  pay 
a membership fee. That amount is initial 
balance on internal capital account. 
Membership rights are quite separeted from 
property rights. Members may have different 
value on their accounts, but regardlles of that 
amount every member has only one vote. 
Every member gets interest on account 
balance (usually 7%) There is also collective 
internal capital account. Spanish cooperative 
law requires that at least 10% of net earnings 
must be reserved for social and educational 
fund. With that amount Mondragon finance 
community schools, projects and unemploy-
ment benefits. Additional 20% is allocated 
on collective account but unlike the 10% of 
social dividend that amount stays in the firm. 
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Remainder of 70% is allocated to individual 
capital accounts. So, it can be seen that 
Ellerman's democratic firm has almost 
completely identical structure to Mondragon. 
Exception is that in Mondragon payments 
from individual capital accounts are made 
after leaving the company. But, if the 
workers terminate employment because of 
for example working for competitor then the 
30% of individual's account is forfeited and 
credited to collective account  in contrary to 
termination because of circumstances 
beyond their control or retirement when the 
100%  of value is paid out [3]. 
Mondragon structure is also built into 
structure of hybrid democratic firm
14
. The 
point is that worker cooperatives are always 
been „all or nothing“, that is, there is no 
intermediate stage which allows workers to 
gain 100% ownership in few years. So, 
mondragon-type worker cooperative model 
is not always possible and appropriate. Share 
ownership is another type of worker 
ownership, but it has his own problems. 
There are two major forms of employee 
share ownership. Employees can own shares 
directly, which means individual ownership 
of certain employees and freedom of selling 
shares at freewill. Usually better-paid 
employees will purchase more shares and 
profits and control power will gravitate 
quickly to managerial ranks. Also lower-paid 
employess generally have smaller income 
and thus incentive for selling shares. So, that 
types of companies are soon degenerating 
into pure capitalist or managerial firms [4]. 
Many of problems of direct employee 
ownership can be solved by another model 
of share ownership – Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan (ESOP). 
ESOP is a type of indirect employee 
share ownership. The main characteristic of 
ESOP model is a trust ESOT (Employee 
Stock Ownership Trust) in which the 
company-sponsor contributs shares or 
money to buy shares of company in which 
employee is working. Every employee has 
it's account in ESOT. Employees cannot sell 
these shares until retirement when usually 
company is buying back because it (usually) 
has right to first refusal. Actually, the main 
inovation of ESOP is buyout through loan- 
so called leveraged ESOP - where the 
workers on the basis of companies lending 
power get shares of the comapny. ESOP also 
has many tax advantages for company, prior 
owners, lender and workers. So, upon first 
ESOP legalisation 1974 (ERISA) until now 
there are about 11 000 ESOP companies 
with about more than 10% of (industrial) 
labour force working in ESOP companies. 
But of main interest is lack of restructuring 
conventional bundle of ownership rights [4] 
[5]. 
Conventional ESOP's are called ,by 
Ellerman, workers capitalist corporations. 
This means that membership rights are not 
restructured as personal right assigned to the 
functional role working in the firm. They 
remain property rights  attached to shares 
and thus organization is a property-based 
organization. Voting rights are proportional 
to the number of shares so there is not one-
person/one vote rule. Yet, there is more than 
that- there is no legal requirement for full 
voting rights to be passed-through (that 
doesn't apply to public companies - 3% of 
ESOP's) except about most important 
questions. The trustee votes the shares and 
he is usually appointed by top-managers. 
Also, in any capitalist corporation profit are 
distributed in two ways - dividends and 
capital gains. So, profit goes to capital and it 
is proportional to number of shares that are 
owned, not labour. In that way ESOP's 
violate the basic principles of democratic 
firm. There is no change in the nature of 
ownership - only the owner is changed. In 
ESOP's, employees cannot be „masters“ as 
workers but as small capitalists [1] [4]. But, 
ironically ESOP's have some labor – based 
characteristics which are (not intentionally) 
solving some problems that democratic firms 
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have, even mondragon-type of worker 
cooperatives.  
Singnificant parts of legal structure 
of democratic firm in ESOP  come from fact 
that ESOP is variation of pension plan. 
Participation in pension plan is correlated 
with working in the firm, and companies do 
not make pension contribution for people not 
working in the firm. In an ESOP, the shares 
are not individually owned as salabale 
property. They are in contrary held in trust 
which prevents the workers to sell their 
shares. It is also not a worker individual 
decision to become an owner; when the loan 
payments are made, shares are usually 
alocated among all employees in accordance 
to salaries or wages
15
. Like in pension plans, 
there is non-discrimination rule which 
prevents that contributions are restricted to 
only certain workers. Thus, „membership“ 
cannot be restricted to „old members“ who 
can sonner or later starting act greedy and 
prevent new people to be members, not just 
employees [5]. 
Now, we must transform our 
primarily focus from micro-level to macro-
level, that is from questions about 
democratic firm to more difficult questions 
of economic democracy. That focus must be 
restricted to basic questions that is consistent 





The problems are not theoretic 
nature. Indeed, Ellerman provides very good 
theoretical setting for analysis of different 
worker ownership models in capitalism. By 
comparating his standards for analysis with 
different most popular examples of worker 
ownership models, his conclusions coincide 
with empirical results. On the (say) micro-
level or on a level of  particular enterprise 
we can found a very interesting and logic 
theory. But, many question arise when we 
need to transform our focus from micro-level 
of democratic firm to macro-level of 
economic democracy „where the 
predominant enterprises are democratic 
firms“. [1] 
But, first of all, the question of pure 
application of democratic theory to the firm 
arises. In other words, can democracy in 
enterprise be so comparable to the (so 
called) democracy in political life (town or 
state). Is David Ellerman overseeing some 
fundamental differences between two forms? 
Is he insisting too much on representative 
democracy and can  that representative 
democracy in firm be main principle of 
democratic self-determination of workers? 
Of course, even in the smallest enterprise 
there is a need for some delegation of 
authority (at least for now). But, is it the 
right to vote for governors enough or the 
main principle of structure of governence 
would be, for example, that any decision that 
can be made in that way, must be made on a 
lowest possible level, like for example 
Horvat [6] said. Ellerman didn't oversee the 
need for direct day-to day participation, but 
it seems that it is not a important feature of 
governance structure. If nothing else, there is 
a need for caution because representative 
democracy can be easy transformed to 
elitistic and self-perpetuating oligarchy. 
Also, Ellerman model is based 
primarly on Mondragon, namely system of 
internal capital accounts. Rise and fall of 
value on individual internal capital account 
is based on retained earnings. To make 
earnings, enterprise must have goal of 
making profit. But, what about the workers 
in non-profit institutions like schools, 
hospitals or cultural institutions which do not 
exist to make profit, but contribute to 
national product as well as other workers. 
Same „objection“ is introduced by Horvat 
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[7]. Mondragon is maybe the most impresive 
example of democratic firm system, but in 
order to survive on global market, he nedded 
to adjust his principles. So, there is a rise of 
hired (part –time) workers especially outside 
the borders of Spain and Europe.
16
 This is 
solved, in Ellerman's model by forbiding  
employment relation. But, what is not so 
clear is – can we just use the structure and 
principles of model that was bulit-up under 
different socio-economic system as the core 
of another system or the whole nature of that 
model must be (and will be) changed? 
It is not clear what Ellerman's 
economic democracy is in concrete sense. 
Maybe some form of „famous“ market 
socialism? But is it the nature of market 
automaticly changed by forbidding employ-
ment relation? It would be logical that some 
aspects are, but is it prevented from having 
social consequences that are familiar for 
long time in heterdox theory? There are to 
many questions and too little answers. 
And of course, the question of 
transformation (transition) to economic 
democracy. So called socialist-utopist two 
century ago, thought that the whole world 
will see the undeniable strenght of their 
communities and that capitalist will finance 
their projects.  Mondragon has big influence 
over the world but is the unfriendly system 
and hostile environment that prevent the 
mondragon-type to be predominant even in 
one country, not to mention world wide. To 
be clear, it is not the Ellerman who oversees 
all of these question. He clearly said that his 
theory is not concerned with broader social 
aspects. It is just that we cannot use 
Ellerman's theory (without a certain dose of 
reserve) beyond the field of analysis and 
implementation most appropriate structure of 




This paper gave a review of 
Ellerman's perspective of democratic firms 
in basic aspects. It covered principles, nature 
and structure and in that way it illustrated the 
core of Ellerman's theory. The main aspect 
of theory is restructuring conventional 
bundle of property rights, namely the 
membership rights, into personal rights. 
Also, important feature is keeping net asset 
rights as property rights and its 
reconstruction as internal loan capital. 
Through Ellerman's standards for 
comparation we can, in consistent way, 
analyse different types of familiar models of 
democratic firms and find empirical 
evidence. In that sense, we can also use 
Ellerman's structure as a background for 
practical implementation in already 
completely workers-owned companies, those 
companies where majority or minority 
ownership is in hands of workers  or a 
companies that want to convert themselves 
into worker-owned companies. 
The problems arise when we need to 
transcend to macro-level. It is not enought to 
say that by abolition of employment relation, 
the market, private property or enterpreneur-
ship are not abolish but they nature is 
changed. Without detailed analysis of 
economic democracy which in mentioned 
articles and books are skipped, we cannot 
give a concrete conclusions about it. It is 
true that new society is borning out of old 
one. But, can the base from which it is 
borned be unchanged as a core of new 
society. Different institucional setting 
(socio-economic system) – different model 
is appropriate. Hence, having that on mind, 
we nedd to separate analytical background 
for examining particular examples of 
democratic firm from principles and 
structure on which the new society must be 
built.   
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2
Whole product includes positive (outputs) 
as well as negative (used-up inputs) results 
of production. 
3
But, all this doesn't imply that capitalist 
owner class doesn't have prevailing social 
power in capitalism. 
4
For closer look of comparative views of 
production process see; [1] p. 11-14 and [2] 
p. 42- 46. 
5
„A person or a group is said to be de facto 
or factual responsible for a certain result if it 
was the purposeful result of their intetional 
joint actions“ [1] 
6
It is very important to understand that this 
argument does not imply preventing 
someone to have private ownership over 
capital. It just prevents capital owner to have 
residual claimant role as capital owner (he 
can have residual claimant role as member 
of a firm). It forbids someone to make 
natural invalid contract of hiring human 
beings. Ellerman is not for abolishing private 
property. In fact, he states that capitalism is 
breaking the basic principles of private 
property that is concidered as fundamental 
characteristic of it. 
7
„Personal right is a right that attaches to  an 
individual because the person satisfies some 
qualification such as playing a certain 
functional role (examples are human rights 
or political citizienship rights). They are not 
transferable, salable and they cannot be 
concentrated. In contrary person don't have 
to satisfy functional role to hold certain 
property right. Property rights can change 
over night and can be (and mostly they are 
D.W) concentrated in a few hands“ [1]. 
8
By democratc socialism Ellerman means 
the system where the bulk of a industry is in 
hands of a state which is political democracy 
[1] p. 35. 
9
If the worker becomes a member he need to 
pay standard membership fee. This payment 
can be arranged by payroll deductions. 
10
About nature of „ownership“ in democratic 
firm and its social aspects see: [1] p. 54-56. 
For inheritability test see: [1] p. 36. 
11
It is interesting what one of the founders 
said to famous Don Arizmendi when he 
propose the development of cooperative 
bank; „We told him, yesterday we were 
craftsmen, foreman and engineers. Today we 
are trying to learn how to be managers and 
executives. Tomorrow you want us to 
become bankers. That is impossible“ [3]  
But, Father Arizmendi was persuasive. 
12
See: [3] p. 22-31. 
13
See: [3] p. 14-22. 
14
For model of hybrid democratic firm see: 
[1] p. 82-93 
15
Let us recall that alocation to individual 
capital accounts are made in accordance to 
labour patronage, and wage or salary can be 
measure of labour patronage 
16
There are many articles about  modern 
problems of spreading Mondragon outside 
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